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INTRODUCTION

The welfare reform measures currently pending before Congress,'

* VisitingAssistant Professor, University of Toledo College ofLaw, B.A., BarnardCollege, 1985;
J.D., Yale Law School 1990. I would like to thank Clark Cunningham, Stephen Wizner, Owen
Fiss, and Denise Morgan for their early advice and support, Wendy Pollack and Dan Lesser for
their guidance, David Harris, Kimberly O'Leary, and Richard Saphire for their time and
thoughtful comments, and all of my former colleagues at the Legal Assistance Foundation of
Chicago. Most of all, I wish to thank W. David Koeninger for inspiring me to form a clear vision
and helping me to express that vision.
1. Throughout the Article, I will refer to proposed reforms in the Personal Responsibility
Act, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101-107 (1995). The House of Representatives passed the
Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, as amended, on March 24, 1995. 141 CONG. REc. H3790
(daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995). Six months later, the Senate passed the Act with an amendment in
the nature of a substitute and sent the bill to a conference committee. 141 CONG. REc. S13,802,
S13,904 (daily ed. Sept, 19, 1995). A conference report was filed on December 20, 1995, 141
CONG. REc. H15,237 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995), approved by the House of Representatives on
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would restrict and reduce welfare benefits in many ways. Perhaps the
most dramatic change in the proposed reform measures, however, is
the replacement of the current system of federal entitlements by a
system based on block grants to be administered by state governments.2 The new block grant system would completely alter the
existing process whereby welfare benefits are funded and administered by the federal government. Under the current system, states
must comply with extensive federal regulations in order to receive
federal matching funds for welfare benefits.' The proposed system,
however, would not require states to comply with an elaborate system
of federal regulations, but would allow states to receive block grants
with fewer restrictions attached.4 The block grant system would
enable states to experiment with welfare reform without the procedural protections for welfare recipients provided by the current system of
entitlements.
Absent the adoption of additional measures by states to ensure due
process in the allocation of block grant funds, the new system will
have a particularly harmful effect on welfare recipients, especially on
women and people of color. Under the current system, welfare
recipients are entitled to a due process hearing, which is subject to
judicial review, if benefits are denied or terminated.5 Under the
proposed block grant system, welfare recipients would no longer be
December 21, 1995, 141 CONG. REC. H15,533 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995), and approved by the
Senate on December 22, 1995, 141 CONG. REc. S19,181 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995). Unless
otherwise noted, references to H.R. 4 in this Article will refer to the conference report. 141
CONG. Rac. H15,317 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) [hereinafter H.R. 4]. The President vetoed the
bill on January 9, 1996. 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 30-32 (an. 9, 1996). Subsequent to the
President's veto, another welfare reform bill was introduced in the House of Representatives,
which also would end the entitlement status of benefits and give them to states in the form of
block grants. See H.R. 2915, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 100-112 (1996) (currently pending in

committee).
2. H.R. 4, supranote 1, § 103.
3. Seegenerally 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687 (1994) (setting forth program forAid to Families With
Dependent Children (AFDC)); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1-100.13 (1995) (containing regulations for
Department of Health and Human Services to implement AFDC).
4. See H.R. 4, supranote 1, § 103. The Personal Responsibility Act would have ended the
system of entitlements and replaced it with one of block grants of funding to the states. Id. The
bill specifically stated that welfare benefits are no longer entitlements. Id. The transfer of the
power to the states in administering welfare benefits was one of the primary goals of the drafters
of the Personal Responsibility Act See 141 CONG. REc. S11,601-02 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Dole) ("Our bill is based on three conservative principles: First and
foremost, welfare reform should be designed and run by those closest to the problem-the
State.... States should not have to play a game of 'mother may I' with the Federal Government
when it comes to welfare."). State governors also strongly support the provision of welfare
benefits to states in the form of block grants, and recently unanimously endorsed a proposal to
do so. See Todd S. Purdum, GovernorsAdopt Plan to OverhaulAidfor the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
1996, at Al.
5. See infranotes 60-100 and accompanying text (discussing due process concept in context
of current dispute resolution scheme).
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entitled to such hearings. Because the vast majority of welfare
recipients are women, 6 a significant number are people of color,7 and,
by definition, welfare recipients are low income, the loss of due
process will be particularly harmful for them. Empirical studies
illustrate the importance of due process to protect low income women
and people of color from decisions based on prejudice.8 Process also
serves as a means of empowerment for those who are disempowered
from society due to their race, class, or gender.9 Moreover, recent
welfare reform measures, which reduce benefits and tighten eligibility
requirements, make the provision of due process even more crucial
as recipients struggle to comply with ever more complex and
draconian eligibility requirements. Therefore, any program of welfare
reform must maintain a system of due process rights for welfare
recipients.
Part I of this Article discusses why due process is particularly
important for poor people, for women and for people of color. Part
II examines the existing system of due process hearings and the
reasoning behind that system. Part III addresses the new welfare
system being considered in Congress, and its effect on due process.
Part IV considers the current trend toward intrusive welfare reform
measures, which heightens the importance of due process for welfare
recipients. Part V analyzes the approach of the courts to across-theboard cutbacks in welfare benefits similar to those being considered
in Congress. Part VI presents new approaches for maintaining due
process for welfare recipients.
Because I am most familiar with the law of the state of Illinois," ° I
refer frequently to Illinois law. The recent developments in welfare

6.

See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, RECIPIENT CHARACTERISTICS STUDY: AID
tbl. 8 (1979) [hereinafter RECIPIENT CHARACSTICS

TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN

STUDY] (noting that in 1979, the last year that the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) published statistics on the gender and race of recipients, 80.6% of families receiving
AFDC were headed by mothers or other female relatives, while only 17.4% of families were
headed by fathers or other male relatives).
7. See id. at tbls. 13-14 (reporting that in 1979, 43.9% of AFDC recipients were African
American, 51.7% of recipients were white, 13.6% of recipients were of Hispanic origin, 1.4%
were American Indian, 1.0% were Asian and 2.0% were other or unknown). Currently, 39% of
AFDC recipients are white, 37% are African American, and 18% are of Hispanic origin. All
Things Considered(Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Sept. 19, 1995), availablein LEXIS, News Library,
Script File.
8. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text (discussing studies showing that decision
makers are more likely to be influenced by prejudice in informal proceedings).
9. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (discussing process as means of empowerment).

10. I am familiar with the law of the State of Illinois due to my four years of experience as
an advocate for the poor on the south side of Chicago.
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law in Illinois are typical of those throughout the country, and serve
as useful illustrations of the arguments developed herein.
I.

THE IMPORTANCE OF DUE PROCESS FOR LOW-INCOME PEOPLE OF
COLOR, PARTICULARLY WOMEN OF COLOR

The lack of an entitlement to welfare benefits and accompanying
due process rights" would harm welfare recipients by denying them
the enforceable right to have the state treat them fairly in the
allocation of those benefits. The right to fair treatment by the state
is fundamental in our society, and structured rights serve to empower
those who are disenfranchised due to their race, class, or gender. A
system of structured rights, with built-in safeguards, is essential to
those people; the most vulnerable in our society.
Since 1971, studies have illustrated the importance of formal
process for low-income people, in situations where their property
rights are injeopardy. In 1976, a study of the landlord/tenant courts
in Cook County, Illinois, entitled Judgment, Landlord, analyzed the
system of courts through which the property rights of low-income
people most often are determined. The authors of the study found
that in the relatively informal process of the landlord/tenant courts,
tenants almost always lost their cases, and in most cases, were unable
even to present a defense. 3 The study showed that tenants were
twice as likely to win their cases when the judges were compelled to
adopt more formal procedures, as a result of the tenants being
represented by attorneys. 4 Significantly, whether the landlord was
represented by an attorney had no statistical effect because the
landlords did not need a formal process to win.'

11. The current system of procedural protections for welfare beneficiaries is rooted in the
entitlement status of welfare benefits. See infra notes 78-81 and 166 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of the procedural protections to which welfare recipients are currently entitled, see
infra Part II, notes 60-100 and accompanying text.
12.

See generally AnthonyJ. Fusco, Jr. et al., Chicago'sEviction Court: A Tenants' Court of No

Resort. 17 URBAN L. ANN. 93 (1979) (detailing results of landlord/tenant courts study).
13. See id. at 103 (reporting that in courts studied, tenants who appeared in court on trial
day won possession judgments in only 11% of cases). Unrepresented tenants who attempted
to raise valid defenses to non-payment of rent based on the conditions of their apartment (valid
defense at the time under Illinois law), lost 93.3% of their cases. Id. at 109.
14. 1& at 114 (finding that 13.3% of tenants represented by attorneys won possession of
their apartments, whereas only 6% of unrepresented tenants won possession). While 17.3% of
tenants represented by attorneys succeeded in dismissing the case against them, only 7.8% of
unrepresented tenants won dismissal motions. Id. at 115. The improvement in the results for
tenants who are represented by an attorney indicates the limits of structured process for
unrepresented parties. See infra note 22 (providing excerpt of transcript of hearing for
unrepresented tenants).
15. Fusco et al., supranote 12, at 116 (stating that pro se landlords were awarded summary
possession orders in 85.6% of cases, which was same percentage recorded for landlords
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Another study of landlord/tenant courts, conducted in the Bronx
in 1982, reached similar conclusions.16 That study found that most
eviction cases pending in the Bronx courtrooms were decided not in
the courtrooms, but by settlement in the hallways, and that the
tenants fared poorly in those settlements." To improve the tenants'
chances of winning, the South Bronx Legal Services Corporation
embarked on a campaign to formalize the process by demanding trials
for tenants and raising technical defenses and arguments. 18 Landlords responded by advocating successfully for a less formal tribunal
did not fare nearly
to resolve landlord/tenant disputes.' 9 2Tenants
0
tribunals.
formal
less
new,
the
in
as well
As a legal services attorney in Chicago, Illinois, I witnessed the
importance of structured process for my clients, low-income people
who were predominantly African American 2 Much of what legal
services attorneys do, in Chicago and elsewhere, is to insure that their
clients get a full and fair hearing in their cases. For example, from
my practice in the landlord/tenant courts in Cook County, Illinois,
Judgment, Landlordappears to be an accurate portrayal of those courts.
I have observed that tenants cannot win their cases, or even present
in court is formalized by their
a defense, unless their appearance
22
representation by an attorney.
Much of the practice of legal services attorneys involves representing clients at due process hearings regarding government benefits.

represented by counsel).
16.

See Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls ofJustice, the Only Justice Is in the Halls, in 1 THE

20.

Id.

POLITCS OF INFORMALJuSTICE 119, 128-29 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (reporting wide latitude
extended by courts to landlords).
17. Id. at 129.
18. Id. at 128-33.
19. Id. at 145.

21. My clients were almost all African American because my office was located in a
segregated neighborhood on the south side of Chicago.
22. The following is an excerpt from a transcript of a "trial" in eviction court in Cook
County, Illinois, which is typical of the "trials" of un-represented tenants. At issue was whether
or not the tenant had violated her lease by possessing illegal drugs in her apartment. The trial
transpired as follows:
ATTORNEY FOR LANDLORD: Your Honor, a single action for possession only based
upon a landlord's notice of termination.
THE COURT: All right. We have [the tenant in court]. No money?
ATTORNEY FOR LANDLORD: No money, your Honor.
THE DEFENDANT: No, I don't.
THE COURT: All right. We'll make it 14 days [to move] then, 2-15-94. Fourteen days,
no money. Okay.
ATTORNEY FOR LANDLORD: Thank you.
National Mortgage Funding v.Jernigan, No. 94 M1-701510 (Cir. Ct.of Cook County, Ill., County
Dep't- County Div., 1st Mun. Dist., Feb. 1, 1994) (transcript on file with The American University
Law Review).
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Many of those hearings involve arbitrary denials or terminations of
benefits by untrained, uninformed, or biased workers at the Department of Public Aid and other governmental agencies.2" For exam-

ple, we represented clients at many hearings where welfare caseworkers had miscalculated the adjustments to be made to benefit levels of

welfare recipients who work part time, and Social Security hearings
where case workers had overlooked or disregarded evidence that

established a claimant's disability.24 Therefore, I understand the
importance of the procedural protections from personal experience.25 More importantly, our clients, low-income persons of color,
benefited from those procedural protections, without which they risk

losing the public benefits that are vital to their survival.
Both the studies of urban landlord/tenant courts and my experiences representing low-income people of color before urban courts
and administrative agencies indicate the importance of a formal
process for urban tenants in determining their property rights to their
incomes and to the homes in which they live. They also illustrate the
limits of the effectiveness of formal process for a person who is not
represented by an attorney. Decisionmakers are more likely to gloss
over formal protections unless they are enforced by the party's
attorney or other representative.
Formal processes should be
improved to accommodate unrepresented parties. That does not
reduce the importance of procedural protections, however, nor does
it reduce their significance when properly enforced.
Scholars who have analyzed the results of these and other empirical
studies have found that in a less formal process such as mediation, the
party with less experience, money, and professional prestige is likely
to fare poorly.26 Often, the losing party is one who is disempowered

23.

See generally William H. Simon, The Rule of Law and Two Realms of Welfare Administration,

56 BRooK. L. REv. 777 (1990) (reporting that educational qualifications and aspirations of
administrative staff are lower than 20 years ago).
24. Of course, it would be most advantageous to recipients if the initial decisionmaking
process was improved. The right to due process provides the only legal right to such an
improved system, and the only legal basis for advocating for reforms such as better qualified
caseworkers or smaller case loads. Moreover, the right to a hearing remains the most important
constraint on arbitrary decisionmaking because caseworkers are less likely to make arbitrary
decisions if they know that their decisions can be appealed and overturned.
25. For example, I participated in an unemployment benefits hearing, in which the
representative of the employer accused the referee of being biased against represented
claimants. In fact, the employer's representative was not concerned about bias so much as the
fact that the claimant had an hour-long hearing in which she presented her story and crossexamined his witnesses. I witnessed the same employer's representative at another hearing with
the same referee in which the representative did not complain of bias. That hearing had lasted
only 10 minutes.
26. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073, 1076 (1984) (espousing that
poorer parties are disadvantaged in bargaining process because of limited resources to finance
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due to race, level of income, or gender.17 The imbalance is due to
the lack of procedural protections in the less formal alternative
dispute resolution processes.
In the process of settlement, the inequalities of wealth between the
parties is a legitimate component of the process.2" In contrast, the
judicial process knowingly struggles against those inequalities by
providing formalized procedural protections.29 Therefore, the more
formal the decisionmaking process, the better chance the poorer, less
educated party has to prevail. Furthermore, "deformalization may
increase the risk of class-based prejudice." ° Empirical studies show
that people are more likely to express their prejudices in less formal
situations." As a result, decisionmakers are more likely to express,
and be swayed by, their prejudices in less formal situations, such as
mediation. 2 Formalized safeguards in the judicial process, established by the rules of civil procedure, including the requirement of
notice, and the rules of evidence which confine testimony to the legal
issues presented at the case, aid in ensuring that the decision is made
fairly." To protect parties from prejudice based on race or class,
dispute resolution measures should retain as much formality as
possible in their structure.'
Feminist scholars also have critically analyzed alternative dispute
resolution measures in family law matters, and noted the danger to
women that the lack of procedural protections can pose. 35 Media-

litigation); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1395 (stating that without procedural
formalities, weaker party stands little or no chance of succeeding in litigation).
27. Delgado et al., supra note 26, at 1395; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process
Dangersfor Women, 100 YALE LJ. 1545, 1564-67, 1587-88 (1991).
28. Fiss, supranote 26, at 1076.
29. See Fiss, supranote 26, at 1077-78 (stating that court can employ several measures, such
as calling its own witnesses, asking questions, and inviting other persons and institutions to
participate as amici, to lessen impact of distributional inequalities through guiding presence of
judge).
30. Delgado et al., supranote 26, at 1360; see also Grillo, supra note 27, at 1587-88 (observing
that informal nature of mediation settling may promote prejudices).
31. Delgado et al., supranote 26, at 1389, 1402-03 (referencing studies that find prejudice
constrained in formal group structures (citing G. Allport, Prudice: Is It Societal or Personal?in
RACIAL ATTrrUDES INAMERICA: ANALYSES AND FINDINGS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGy 165-66 (1972))).
32. Delgado et al., supranote 26, at 1402.
33. Delgado et al., supra note 26, at 1373-74; see also ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 102.70
(1995) (establishing review and appeal process for children and families who request or receive
child welfare services).
34. See Delgado et al., supra note 26, at 1403 (recommending limiting alternative dispute
resolution to cases involving adversarial parties of comparable power and status).
35. See generally Grillo, supra note 27 (analyzing effect of mandatory arbitration of child
custody disputes on women who are obtaining divorces); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediationof WifeAbuse
Cases: The Adverse Impact ofInformalDisputeResolution on Women, 7 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 57 (1984)
(finding mediation to be weak formal legal remedy).
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tors tend to ignore precedent and legal rules that might protect the
women participating," base their decisions on facts that might be7
inadmissible at trial because of attorney-client or other privilege,
and disregard facts that a judge might find relevant, including a
history of abuse on the part of the respondent/abuser."8 Mediators
also are more likely to be swayed by prejudice than judges because
mediators are not restricted by the more formal rules of court
proceedings.3 9
Perhaps most significantly, denying women the ability to air their
disputes in a formal court process, on their own or through the
representation of an attorney, may effectively deny them their voice,
as women have been taught by society to suppress their anger, and
not to take a strong position in informal situations.4" "The process
of claiming rights, by itself, can be empowering for people who have
not shared societal power."41

The concerns of these feminist scholars are applicable to recipients
of AFDC, the vast majority of whom are women.42 AFDC recipients
will be similarly silenced by the restrictions of the proposed block
grant program. The proposed block grant system does not include
any provisions for participation by welfare recipients, whether formal
or informal. The proposed system would allow recipients no means
to redress wrongs done to them by impersonal bureaucrats, completely denying recipients their voices, and serving further to disempower
them. Because it leaves welfare recipients voiceless, the proposed
block grant system decreases their access to the dominant socioeconomic system, rather than increasing access, the stated goal of
recent reform measures.43 Most significantly, the proposed system
denies welfare recipients the ability to enforce their rights through an

36. See Grillo, supra note 27, at 1560 (arguing that informal law of mediation setting deemphasizes or avoids discussion of principles, blame, and rights).
37. See Grillo, supra note 27, at 1597 (explaining that because lawyers are typically excluded
from mediation sessions, privileged material may mistakenly be revealed by client during
mediation which is often then impossible to keep out of later court proceeding).
38. Grillo, supra note 27, at 1463-64 (noting that it is typical for mediators to insist that

parties waste no time complaining about past conduct of spouse).
39. Grillo, supranote 27, at 1585-89.
40. See Grillo, supra note 27, at 1576 (finding that despite changes brought about by recent
feminist movement, expressions of anger and aggression are still considered "masculine" in men
and "unfeminine" in women).
41. Grillo, supranote 27, at 1558.
42. See RECIPIENT CHARACTERISTICS STUDY, supranote 6 (reporting gender disparity among

AFDC recipients).
43. See H.R. 4, supranote 1, § 103 (stating that one purpose of the Personal Responsibility
Act is to "end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job

preparation, work and marriage"). In other words, the purpose is to allow recipients access to
the dominant society through the means of employment and marriage to working spouses.
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effective appeals process. Welfare recipients must retain the voices
they now have in a protective, formal appeal process.
Several scholars have recognized the importance of structured
rights for people of color. These scholars emphasize the importance
of structured rights for people of color, especially low-income and
female people of color, from the perspective of those who have
experienced the importance of those rights. ' Although the focus
of these scholars is civil rights rather than procedural rights, their
concerns are equally attributable to procedural rights regarding
property.
Professor Patricia Williams tells a story about renting an apartment
at the same time as her colleague, Peter Gabel. 5 Williams recounts
that Gabel, a white man who was sensitive about not alienating people
with his legal knowledge and status as a lawyer and law professor,
wanted an informal relationship with his landlord.46 He did not sign
a lease, and gave a deposit in cash without receiving a receipt.4 7 In
contrast, Williams, an African-American woman who grew up in lowincome neighborhoods where landlords refused to give their tenants
the protection of a lease, rented an apartment from a friend, but still
insisted on a detailed, lengthily negotiated lease that established an
That lease set forth
arm's length relationship with her landlord.
the structured rights that she considered important to her as an
African-American woman.
Procedural rights are particularly important for women of color
because women of color have been historically discriminated against
in our society.4 9 Poor women of color have felt the brunt of
discrimination on many levels.5" They encounter discrimination
when seeking-jobs, housing, and financial assistance. 5 As a result,

44. See, eg., Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar Does CriticalLegal Studies Have What
Minorities Want?, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301, 314-15 (1987) (finding informal processes to
have negative impact on minorities); MariJ. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CiticalLegalStudies
and Reparations,22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 390-91 (1987) (identifying need for structure
in containing and eliminating racism); PatriciaJ. Williams, Alchemical Notes: ReconstructingIdeals
From DeconstructedRights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 408 (1987) [hereinafter Williams,
Alchemical Notes] (commenting on need for formal legal processes to assure rights).
45. Williams, Alchemical Notes, supra note 44, at 406-07.
46. Williams, Alchemical Notes, supra note 44, at 406.
47. Williams, Alchemical Notes, supra note 44, at 406.
48. Williams, Alchemical Notes, supra note 44, at 407-08.
49. W. E. B. DUBoIs, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 6 (1903); CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS
119-20 (1994).
50. Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals,
102 YALE LJ. 719, 723 (1992) [hereinafter Williams, The Ideology of Division].
51. 1l
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many are relegated to the most run-down, dangerous neighborhoods
in urban areas.52
Historically, the government also has discriminated against women
of color with respect to welfare benefits. For example, when the
Social Security Act was first enacted in 1934, states were allowed to set
eligibility standards for receiving benefits, and to set the amount of
benefits. 3 At that time, Congress considered a provision that would
have forbidden racial discrimination in the allocation of benefits, but
rejected that measure.54 As a result, many southern states discriminated against black welfare applicants, refusing them benefits and/or
setting benefit levels so low that they were impractical, in order to
maintain the low-wage market of women of color, who typically
performed domestic and field work.55
Discrimination against poor people of color, in the allocation of
government benefits, continues to this day. In 1992, a study
conducted by the Social Security Administration found evidence of
discrimination against African-American applicants for Social Security
and Supplemental Security Income benefits.5 6 As a result of the
investigation, the Social Security Administration created a special unit
to process complaints of discrimination made by applicants for Social
Security benefits.5
As Patricia Williams notes, "While rights may not be ends in
themselves, it remains that rights rhetoric has been and continues to

52. See NICHOLAS LEHMAN, THE PROMISED LAND 61-107, 234-52 (1991); ALEx KOTLoWrrz,
THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE (1991) (describing depleted neighborhoods and public housing
developments that are home to many urban low income African Americans).
53. See Williams, The Ideology of Division, supra note 50, at 723 (noting that some states
intentionally excluded from welfare rolls single mothers who were persons of color).
54. Williams, The Ideolog ofDivision, supranote 50, at 723. Federal regulations prohibiting
discrimination in the allocation of welfare (and other federal) benefits were enacted in 1964,
following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994)); 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-80.13 (1995).
55. Williams, The Ideology of Division, supra note 50, at 723-24; see also William H. Simon,
Rights andRedistributionin the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1492 (1986) (recounting that
in 1960s, welfare reform proponents opposed state provisions used to discriminate against single
black mothers who were receiving benefits). The case of King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968),
is an example of the result of successful advocacy in that arena. See infra note 75 (discussing
facts of King case).
56. See Stephen Labaton, Benefits Are Refused More Often to Disabled Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 1992, at 1 (reporting findings of General Accounting Office study that white applicants for
Disability Insurance benefits had 8% better chance of receiving benefits after being turned
down, while those who applied for Supplemental Security Income had 4% advantage over Black
applicants). In Chicago, Black applicants had a 10-17% disadvantage among claimants seeking
benefits in the appeals process. Id. The study found significant disparities for every year as far
back as 1961. Id.
57. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.940 (1995) ("[A]dministrative law judge shall be disqualified if he
or she is prejudiced or impartial with respect to any party.").
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be an effective form of discourse for blacks."5 8 Williams' example,
comparing her approach to lease negotiation with that of Peter Gabel,
and the Judgment, Landlordstudy, which showed that landlords did not
need attorneys to win their cases, illustrate an important point: The
powerful may willingly choose to give up their structured rights, but
those who perceive themselves as less powerful are less willing to give
up the empowerment of structured rights, such as due process. In
fact, people not in power require structured rights, and cannot do
without them. Many African Americans in the civil rights movement
risked their lives in the fight for the structured right to vote in
southern states, so that they could participate in the political
process.5 9 People who are disempowered due to their race, class, or
gender need a formalized, structured process so that their rights can
be protected. They are, however, in grave danger of losing not only
their benefits but the empowerment of due process as a result of
current welfare reform measures.
II. THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF DUE PROCESS HEARINGS
The system of federally funded and state administered welfare
benefits was created by the Social Security Act of 1935.60 The
existing system of due process rights for welfare recipients is a result
of the Supreme Court's ruling in Goldberg v. Kelly," that welfare
recipients are entitled to a fair hearing before their benefits are
terminated.62 The Court's ruling in Goldberg reflected the efforts of
progressives who argued for welfare reforms during the 1960s. Some
progressives argued that the treatment of welfare benefits should be
used as a form of redistribution of wealth.6" They unsuccessfully
attempted to establish a fundamental right to a minimum income for
all citizens.' Other progressives advocated procedural reforms to

58.

Williams, Alchemical Notes, supranote 44, at 410.

59. The Court's finding in Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985), that the legislative
process provides welfare recipients all of the process that is due them when benefit levels are
adjusted by the legislature, is particularly ironic in light of the prolonged and difficult struggle
for African Americans to obtain the right to vote. Id at 130; see infra notes 154-59 and
accompanying text (discussing Atkins case).
60. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Star. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f
(1994)).
61. 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see also Simon, supra note 55, at 1486 (discussing expansion of
public assistance programs in 1960s and 1970s).
62. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
63. See Simon, supra note 55, at 1437-38, 1489-91 (chronicling arguments of progressives
who advocated right to minimum income).
64. SeeSimon, supranote 55, at 1437-38, 1489-91 (commenting thatattempts to incorporate
need-based considerations into "mainstream legal approaches to welfare were largely
unsuccessful"); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (rejecting attempt to

1122

THE AMERICAN UNmvERsIY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1111

the existing system of statutory entitlements as a means of protecting
the recipients of those entitlements.' They argued that the classical
liberal notion of rights-creating a zone of liberty free from government intervention-should be extended to public assistance. 66
Moreover, they embraced the liberal notion of individual rights,
rather than the concept of welfare as a form of redistribution of
wealth, with the right of a minimum income to all recipients."
These reformers achieved significant benefits for welfare recipients,
in the form of procedural rights. They failed, however, to establish
any substantive rights to essential services for poor people, including
the right to jobs, elimination of prejudice, or safety.' Indeed, the
only significant rights most welfare recipients currently enjoy are the
due process protections against the arbitrary denial or termination of
benefits by the state.
The property rights approach to welfare reform, which prevailed
and culminated in the Goldberg ruling, is illustrated in Professor
Charles Reich's seminal article, The New Property.69 In his article,
Reich argued that in modem society, the state has taken on a
significant role in creating wealth through government employment,
licensing, government benefits, and subsidies."0 Reich pointed out
that the larger the role that government has in creating wealth, the
more intrusive it becomes in administering that wealth,7 1 particularly
for welfare recipients who are completely dependent on the state for
their "wealth. 72

establish fundamental right to income). In Dandridge,the Court found that a state needs only
a rational basis to restrict eligibility for welfare benefits, similar to that needed to justify all
economic regulations. 397 U.S. at 485. In his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall stridently
objected, pointing out that the case involved "the literally vital interests of a powerless
minority-poor families without breadwinners .... " Id. at 520 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "It is
the individual interests here at stake that.., most clearly distinguish this case from the 'business
regulation' equal protection cases." Id. at 522 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
65. See Simon, supra note 55, at 1486 (citing Charles Reich as proponent for extending
'classical notions of rights as zones of immunity from state power... to public assistance").
66. Simon, supranote 55, at 1486.
67. Simon, supra note 55, at 1488. Professor Simon argues that the advocates of property
rights abandoned the notion of welfare as a means for the redistribution of wealth. Id. Simon's
view, however, may oversimplify the "property rights" approach. Arguably, government licenses
and benefits, government-created forms of property, are types of wealth redistribution.
68. Ironically, if reformers had been able to establish significant substantive rights for lowincome people, such as a fundamental right to a minimum income, welfare recipients would
neither be in danger of losing their procedural rights, nor the underlying entitlement to
benefits.
69. Charles A. Reich, The New Prperty, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
70. Id. at 739.
71. Id. at 760.
72. Id. at 758; see also Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YA.E LJ. 1246, 1256 (1965) (espousing need for radical new approach to social
welfare to protect and clarify legal rights of beneficiaries).
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At the time that Reich wrote The New Property, many state governments intruded into the intimate details of the lives of welfare
recipients as the state administered their benefits. For example,
welfare recipients often were subjected to unannounced searches of
their homes by caseworkers who were evaluating their "moral
character," and stood in jeopardy of losing their benefits as a result
of those investigations.7" The use of these intrusive measures by the
state illustrated the dangers inherent in the burgeoning welfare
state-the increased role of the state in creating wealth presumed, or
at least ought to have presumed, that the state would administer that
wealth fairly. 4 The personal nature of the welfare caseworker's
scrutiny, however, allowed for unfair and discriminatory treatment of
women who were welfare recipients, particularly African-American
women who lived in the South.75 Reich advocated for procedural
protections, including a fair hearing with judicial review, to insure the
fairness of the state's administration of the wealth that it created.7 6
He maintained that these protections should be provided as a matter
of right to beneficiaries of public wealth."
Six years after Reich's article, the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly
extended the procedural protections advocated by Reich to welfare
beneficiaries. 71 In Goldberg, the Court found that welfare benefits, a
form of property created by the state, are statutory entitlements for
persons qualified to receive them. 79 The Court held that as a form
of property such entitlements are protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court stated that the Due
73. Reich, supranote 69, at 761.
74. Reich, supra note 69, at 778-79.
75. Simon, supra note 55, at 1492. In King v. Smith, the Court struck down an Alabama
statute that deemed the income of any man with whom a single mother was "cohabitating' to
the household of that mother. 392 U.S. 309, 334 (1968). The state of Alabama defined
"cohabitating" as a man and a woman having "'frequent' or 'continuing' sexual relations"
regardless of whether the man lived with the mother. Id. at 314. In King, the mother was an
African-American widow whom the state had determined was having an affair with a married
man. Id. at 315-16. The state included the man's income when calculating the income of Ms.
King's household, even though he was not the father of any of her children and he lived in a
separate household with his wife and nine children. I Ms. King's story was typical of those
African-American welfare recipients whom the white Alabama state welfare workers had harassed,
intruding on the intimate details of their lives and denying them benefits. Simon, supra note
55, at 1492.
76. Reich, supra note 69, at 780-83.
77. Reich, supra note 69, at 785.
78. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970).
79. Id. at 262.
80. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant
part, that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... " U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court explicitly noted that the right
to due process was rooted in the statutory entitlement status of the welfare benefits. Goldberg,
397 U.S. at 262 n.8; see infra note 166. If welfare benefits are no longer statutory entitlements,
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Process Clause requires that benefits cannot be terminated by the
state without a pre-termination evidentiary hearing.8 1 The Due
Process Clause requires, at a minimum, timely and adequate notice
detailing the reasons for the termination, an effective opportunity to
confront adverse witnesses and present evidence orally, the right to
counsel at the hearing, and the right to an impartial decisionmaker
who makes decisions based solely on the evidence presented at the
82
hearing.
The fair hearing requirement is codified in the federal laws
governing the system of Aid to Families With Dependent Children
(AFDC) ." States must adhere to the fair hearing system to receive
federal matching funds for their AFDC programs.8 4 As a result,
states have set up systems of fair hearings as part of their administration of those benefit programs. For example, in Illinois, the
administrative code creates a system of due process hearings that
includes the right to a detailed notice when benefits are denied and
prior to the termination of benefits;'u the right to a hearing before
the termination of benefits; 6 the right to a representative at the
hearing; 7 the right to review evidence in the Department's files; 8
the right to present evidence in support of the recipient's case; 9 the
right to confront and cross examine the state's witnesses; 0 and the
right to subpoena witnesses.9" In addition, the recipient has the
right to a fair and impartial hearing officer,92 and to review the
documents, the findings of fact, and the decision of the hearing

the right to due process established by the Godbergcourtwould no longer apply. See infra note
166 and accompanying text.
81. Goldber, 397 U.S. at 264.
82. Id at 267-71.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (4) (1994). This provision states: "AState plan for aid and services
to needy families and children must: ... (4) provide for grantirig an opportunity for a fair
hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for aid to families with dependent
children is denied or is not acted on with reasonable promptness." Id.
84. See id. § 602(b) (stating that Secretary of Health and Human Services shall approve any
state plan for administration of welfare benefits that fulfils conditions of subsection (a)); id.
§ 604(a) (providing that Secretary shall stop making payments to any state that fails to comply
substantially with requirements of § 602(a)).
85. ILL ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 102.70 (1995).
86. See if. § 102.82. Under this provision, recipients have the right to continuous, unchanged benefits during the appeal process only if they appeal within 10 days of the notice of
the adverse action. Id. § 102.81(a). The right to appeal the adverse action, however, does not
expire until 60 days from the date of the notice. Id.

87. lIt § 104.21(a).
88. 1& § 104.22(a).
89. It § 104.22(b).
90. It § 104.22(c).
91. it § 104.30(a).
92. IM.§ 104.20(b) (1).
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officer.9" The hearing officer, however, is not bound by the rules of
evidence or procedure, "but (the hearing) shall be conducted in a
manner best calculated to conform to substantial justice."94 Finally,
the recipient has the right to judicial review of the hearing process
and decision. 5
This elaborate, formalized system stands in stark contrast to the
somewhat haphazard miasma of the welfare bureaucracy, arising from
overwork and indifference, that pervades the decisions of everyday
caseworkers.96 The due process system acts as a structured safety net
to protect the recipients from arbitrary decisionmaking by caseworkers.
In Goldberg, the State argued that pre-termination hearings would
be too costly, considering the small amount of money that is at stake
in each individual hearing. 7 The Court rejected that argument,
pointing out that although the amount of money at stake may seem
small and inconsequential, it represents the only means of livelihood
for welfare recipients." Much of the current welfare reform debate,
however, focuses on the costs of the governmental bureaucracy
administering the current system. 99 This criticism provides the
underlying rationale for much of the Personal Responsibility Act,

93.
94.

Id.§ 102.83(b).
Id. § 104.23.
95. Id. § 104.70(g).
96. See generally Simon, supra note 23 (discussing dichotomy between bureaucratic
indifference that welfare recipients face daily and elaborate system offormalized hearing rights);
Susan D. Bennett, "No Relief but Upon the Terms of Coming into the House" -- Controlled Spaces,
Invisible Disentitlements and Homelesness in an Urban Shelter System, 104 YALE LJ.2157, 2157-82
(1995) (describing in detail discouraging process of applying and waiting for government
assistance to homeless women in Washington, D.C.).

97. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
98. See id.
at 264 ("For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential
food, clothing, housing and medical care .... Thus the crucial factor in this context.., is that
termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible
recipient of the very means to live while he waits.") (emphasis and citation omitted).
99. See, eg., 141 CONG. REc. S12,894 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Grassley)
("I would rise in support of the amendment [Amend. No. 2508 to H.R. 4 which imposed a 15%
cap on the amount of allocated funds to be used for the administration of welfare benefits] ....
I think we have an appropriate responsibility to the Federal taxpayers to make sure the money
is not eaten up in excess administrative costs.... It seems to me that this [amendment] solves
one of those major, legitimate issues that we ought to deal with here."). The amendment was
approved by a vote of 87 to 5. 141 CONG. REc. S12,895 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1995). The Senate
also exhibited concern about the expense of the bureaucracy administering welfare benefits in
a debate over an amendment offered by Senator Gramm, Amend. No. 2615, which proposed
to reduce by 75% the number of Department of Health and Human Services employees
administering the block grant program. 141 CONG. Rc. S13,642 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1995). As
Senator Ashcroft stated, "One of the taxes on poor Americans, people who are truly needy, is
a bureaucratic tax." 141 CONG. REc. S13,643 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Ashcroft). The Senate subsequently approved the amendment. 141 CONG. REc. S13,771-72
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1995).
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which eliminates the requirement that states maintain a system of fair
°
hearings as a prerequisite for receiving federal funds.'
III.

THE CHANGES PROPOSED BY CONGRESS

Under the welfare reform bill being debated in Congress, welfare
benefits would no longer be entitlements triggering constitutional due
process.
Under the proposed block grant system, the federal
government would end the existing system of AFDC, with all of its
requirements for state participation in the program, and replace it
with a simplified version with fewer restrictions."1
Instead, the
federal government would give the money to states, in the form of
block grants, to be distributed by the states." 2 The block grant

system would differ drastically from the existing AFDC system.
Currently, all people who meet the eligibility requirements for welfare
benefits are entitled to receive those benefits, which are administered
by state agencies. 3 In turn, the states are entitled to federal
funding for every eligible recipient.'4

100.

H.R. 4, supra note 1, §§ 101-116. The Act also specifically ends the entitlement status

of welfare benefits, stating "This part shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family
to assistance under any State program funded under this part." H.R.4, supra note 1, § 103. The
resistance of states to comply with such "strings" attached to federal funds is reflected in the
decision of the Illinois State Legislature to terminate the AFDC program as of December 31,
1998. Act of Mar. 6, 1995, No. 89-6, § 25, 1995 Ill. Legis. Serv. 203, 209 (West) (to be codified
at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 305) [hereinafter Act of Mar. 6, 1995]. The termination of the AFDC
program would make Illinois no longer eligible for matching federal funds, but also would end
the requirement that the state comply with federal regulations, including those requiring due
process hearings that govern disbursement of those funds. But see id. at 214 (to be codified at
ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 305, para. 5/4-17) (directing Illinois Department of Public Aid to seek
waivers of federal law and regulations to establish AFDC demonstration project for imposing

employment and family cap requirements).
101. Current federal regulations contain detailed requirements governing the eligibility of
recipients and the administration of benefits and services that the state must provide for welfare
recipients. See42 U.S.C. § 602 (1994). For example, the regulations govern the calculation of
a recipient's income in minute detail, see, e.g., id. §§ 602(a)(7)-(8), (28), (31), (36); contain

detailed regulations governing child support enforcement systems that states must maintain, see
id. §§ 602(a) (26)-(3), 45 C.F.R. § 302 (1995), and govern the state process of administering the
benefits, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (9), (15), (17). In contrast, H.R. 4 required states to prepare
and operate a program designed to provide assistance to needy families, H.R.4, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 103 (1995) (as introduced), and contained some restrictions (including prohibitions
on states providing assistance for legal aliens, assistance to mothers less than 18 years of age, and
limiting lifetime benefits to 5 years), id § 103, but lacked the detailed restrictions of the
administrative system that it is designed to replace. The conference bill, however, contained
almost as many restrictions as those in the existing system. See H.R.4, §§ 101-116, 141 CONG.
REC. H15,317-91 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995).
102. H.R.4, supra note 1, § 103.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (A) (requiring that "aid to families with dependent children
shall... be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals").
104. See id. § 603 (identifying computation of amount of aid from federal treasury to needy
families in states).
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Under the block grant system, welfare benefits would no longer be
entitlements for recipients. That is, a state could still refuse assistance
even if a recipient meets all eligibility requirements because federal
regulations would not require the state to provide the assistance. 05
States would be free from federal regulations, but would also bear a
burden because the states would not be entitled to federal funding for
0 ' As a result, the states would risk running
every eligible recipient."
out of funding for eligible applicants whenever an economic recession
and its concomitant increase in unemployment caused an increase in
the number of applications.
Many state governors support the block grant system,107 even
though it would result in decreased funding for the states. The
reason for their support is that the block grant system would allow
states to embark on welfare "reform" measures without obtaining
federal approval in the form of a waiver of federal requirements."°8
For example, the Illinois state legislature recently passed a welfare
"reform" act that allows the state, among other things, to create a
"family cap" that denies the recipient additional benefits if another
child is born into the family while the family is already receiving
welfare benefits."° Also, Illinois' welfare reform act sets a maximum
two-year time limit for recipients whose youngest child is age thirteen
or older."' In order for the State of Illinois to implement both
programs, the State must apply for a federal waiver.1 Section 1815
of the U.S. Code requires public participation in the waiver pro-

105. H.R. 4, supra note 1, § 103.
106. See H.R. 4, supra note 1, § 103 (stating that for years 1996 through 2000, state would be
entitled only to amount of money in state family assistance grant that it receives for current
fiscal year).
107. Purdum, supra note 4, at Al.
108. Under the current system, states are allowed to conduct some experimentation with

welfare reform if they are approved by the Department of Health and Human Services as
projects to demonstrate the effectiveness of those experimental measures. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1315(b)(1). Once they are approved, federal regulations governing the administration of
welfare benefits are waived as to those projects. Id The states, however, are permitted to
conduct no more than three projects at one time, and each individual project must be approved

by the Secretary of Health and Human Services after a 30-day period allowing for public
comment. See id. § 1315(b) (1); id. § 1315(b) (3) (A) (requiring approval for waiver of federal
regulations). Under the Personal Responsibility Act, states are subjected to fewer regulations

and encouraged to conduct experimental projects. See H.R. 4, supra note 1, § 103 (providing
that Secretary may "assist" states in developing new programs, using "experimental and control
groups").
109. Act of Mar. 6, 1995, supranote 100. The Personal Responsibility Act also includes a
provision requiring the states to implement such a "family cap." See H.R. 4, supra note 1, § 103
(providing no additional assistance for children born to families receiving assistance).
110. Act of Mar. 6, 1995, supra note 100.
111. See supranote 108 (outlining waiver provisions).
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cess. 1 12 Some welfare recipients have successfully challenged
the
113
waiver process when they were not given adequate input.
Under the block grant system, states could implement any changes
to the welfare programs that they administer without having to obtain
federal approval of those changes. 114 In fact, the Personal Responsibility Act of 1995,1'5 and the subsequent welfare reform bill, do not
include any provisions requiring public participation in state welfare
reform initiatives. The decisions that states have made with regard to
state welfare programs funded entirely with state funds are revealing
in determining the potential impact of this change on welfare
recipients. In recent years, states have cut back significantly on statefunded welfare programs. In September, 1991, for example, the
Michigan state legislature voted to terminate its state-funded General
Assistance Program for non-disabled adults without children." 6 In
1992, the Illinois General Assembly terminated the state-funded
General Assistance Program, which was a cash benefit program for
employable adults, and replaced it with a limited Transitional

112. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(b) (3) (A) (requiring Secretary of Health and Human Services to
release copies of application to public).
113. SeeBeno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057,1073 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that Secretary of Health
and Human Services failed to consider welfare recipient's objections as to impact of decision to
impose statewide reduction of benefits).
114. See H.R. 4, supranote 1, § 103 (stating purpose of act is "to increase the flexibility of
States in operating a program" that provides assistance to needy families, ends dependence "by
promotingjob preparation, work and marriage," and discourages illegitimate births). The state
plans, however, must contain the following elements: (1) provision of cash benefits and work
experience, work preparation, and assistance in locating work; (2) requirement that one parent
must work after receiving benefits for two years; (3) other mandatory work requirements; (4)
provision for immigrants, if treated differently; (5) confidentiality provisions; (6) programs to
reduce illegitimate births; and (7) programs to reduce teenage pregnancy. Id. The bill also
contains the following prohibitions conditioning the use of federal funds: (1) no assistance to
families without minor children; (2) no disregarding certain payments in eligibility or benefit
calculations; (3) no assistance for certain aliens; (4) no assistance for illegitimate births to
minors; (5) no additional assistance to mother on birth of a new child while receiving benefits;
(6) a five-year maximum length of benefits; (7) no assistance for families failing to cooperate
in child support or paternity establishment; (8) no support if the parent does not assign child
support rights to the state; (9) no full payments if paternity is not established; and (10) no
benefits for 10 years if residency is fraudulently misrepresented to the welfare program. Id. The
requirement of due process hearings is notably absent from the regulations and restrictions
detailed in the bill as compared to the current system, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (1994), which
requires that the state plan "provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the
State agency to any individual whose claim for aid to families with dependent children is denied
or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness."
115. See H.R. 4,supranote 1, §§ 101-116; see also supranote 1.
116. Rather than officially terminating the General Assistance Program, in September 1991,
the Michigan State Legislature approved an appropriations bill which allocated no money for
the program. SeeSaxon v. Department of Social Servs., 479 N.W.2d 361, 366 (1992). In Saxon,
the court found that the replacement of general assistance, by a state disability assistance
program, which limited eligibility to disabled adults, did not violate due process or title-object
and amendment-republication clauses of the Michigan State Constitution. Id. at 366-68.
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Assistance Program. 1 7 In 1995, the Illinois General Assembly
and severely
abolished the Transitional Assistance Program'
benefits." 9
for
state-funded
limited the eligibility of disabled adults
The lack of an entitlement to federal funds for both states and
recipients will create a double-whammy where the victims will be
welfare recipients. On one hand, recipients are likely to see their
benefits cut drastically, and the requirements for eligibility tightened.
On the other hand, recipients will lose the due process hearings on
which they rely to insure that their benefits are not denied or
discontinued arbitrarily. No longer entitled to benefits even if
eligible, recipients would also no longer be entitled to due process
hearings to prove their eligibility. As a result, not only will many
recipients lose benefits because they are no longer eligible, but many
eligible applicants and recipients may have their benefits wrongly
denied or discontinued, without recourse to an effective appellate
procedure.
IV.

GOVERNMENT INTRUSION IN RECENT REFORM MEASURES

Recent years have seen an increasing polarization of people in the
United States, by race and class, as well as a dramatic increase in the
number of people who are completely disenfranchised from our
society, living in what Professor Charles Reich calls the "outside" of

117. See 305 .LC.S. 5/6-2 (1992). Under the Transitional Assistance Program established
at that time, an adult without children was eligible for cash assistance only if. he had a serious
physical or mental handicap which restricted him from working; he was over 55 years of age and

had no sustainable employment history; he was needed to care for another person in the
household; he suffered from an addictive drug or alcohol abuse problem; he was homeless due
to a court order of evacuation of the building in which he lived, a fire, domestic violence or
natural disaster, he had no sustained employment history or was illiterate (the Illinois
Department of Public Aid was allowed to limit the time period for individuals to be eligible
under this criteria); he was under the age of 19 and attended high school full-time; he had a

medical condition which required ongoing maintenance medication; or he had a temporary
medically certified incapacitating illness. 305 I.L.C.S. 5/6-11, repealed by PA 89-21, Art. 15, § 155, effectiveJuly 1, 1995. These criteria were abolished by the Illinois General Assembly in July,
1995. d.
118. 305 I.LC.S. 5/3-1a (as amended by P.A 89-21, Art. 15, § 15.5, effective July 1, 1995).
119. See305 I.L.C.S. 5/6-11 (as amended by P. 89-21, At 15, § 15.5, effectiveJuly 1,1995).
Under the new criteria for state-funded aid for disabled adults, individuals are only eligible for
aid if they have an application pending for the federally funded Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) program, and are determined to be disabled by the Illinois Department of Public Aid
using the SSI standards for evaluation, except that individuals whose disability is based solely on
substance addiction are no longer eligible for cash assistance. Id. Prior to 1995, adults were
eligible for cash assistance if they had applied for SSI and were determined to be "probably
eligible for SSI," regardless of the cause of the disability. See 305 I.L.C.S. 5/3-1la (prior to
amendment by PA4- 89-21, Art. 15, § 15.5, effective July 1, 1995). Ironically, the change in
eligibility requirements has caused all recipients to reapply for their benefits under new
standards, necessitating more in-depth due process hearings, and increasing administrative costs.
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society."' The depth of economic insecurity, in which people in
the "outside" live, is the worst threat to these individuals' freedom
because they become completely dependent on government benefits
" ' Welfare reform measures should be designed to end
to survive.12
dependence on those benefits, encourage poor people to become
productive members of our society, and foster their independence
and dignity in the process. To the contrary, the process of welfare
reform has pushed poor people further "outside," imposing increasingly intrusive measures on welfare recipients and further eroding
their dignity and personal freedom.'
The result is an interconnected process of increasing alienation, increasing government
intervention, and erosion of the basic dignity of poor people in our
society. An analysis of recent welfare reform measures illustrates the
heightened importance of retaining the due process rights of welfare
recipients, even as they are being severely eroded.
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court struck down several state welfare
measures which had been particularly intrusive on the lives of those
recipients,"' and in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court established a formalized process to limit the intrusion of the state on individual freedoms
of welfare recipients.12 4 In recent years, the welfare reform debate
has returned to a focus on regulating the behavior of welfare recipients. " The title of the congressional welfare reform act, the "Per-

120. Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE LJ. 1409, 1413 (1991) (describing
"inside" as "space within the organized sector, inside a corporation, government agency, or
institution" and noting difficulty of self-support on "outside" such that "outside freedom"

becomes homelessness and poverty).
121. I& at 1435-36.
122. See id. at 1412-13 (noting that "outside" is zone of impaired freedom because those
without economic support cannot act freely); i& at 1440 ("Both the inside and the outside
partially disable the individual from being a citizen, undervalue her contribution, demean and
denigrate her importance to the community.").
123. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,627 (1969) (invalidating one-year residency
requirement before applicant becomes eligible for AFDC benefits); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
313-14, 333 (1968) (invalidating Alabama regulation that denied benefits to recipient mother
if "substitute father" existed and that said that "substitute father" existed if parties had sexual
relations somewhere between once every week and once every six months); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (invalidating South Carolina provision that denied unemployment
benefits to person who was unwilling to work on Saturdays, her Sabbath day).
124. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-69 (1970) (holding that due process in welfare
terminations requires "timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed
termination," as well as pretermination hearing at which recipient may confront witnesses and
present evidence and arguments orally).
125. See Williams, The Ideology of Division, supra note 50, at 726-41 (describing Wisconsin
legislature's attempt to introduce Family Cap program and experimentation with Leamfare
program that penalizes parents of tenant children for school absences only slightly in excess of
norm of children of non-AFDC recipients). The Family Cap program seeks "to influence poor
women's decisions about procreation," id. at 736, while Learnfare predicates assistance on family
compliance with certain values or modification of "its behavior in ways deemed appropriate by
policymakers." Id at 732.
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sonal Responsibility Act," illustrates the new reformers' emphasis on
more intrusive measures with the alleged purpose of changing the
behavior of welfare recipients so that they will no longer be depenThis measure intrudes significantly on the
dent on welfare.12
liberty of welfare recipients, and may cause many of them to lose their
benefits.
Some intrusive reform measures already have been enacted into
law. For example, federal regulations mandate that state welfare
programs require recipients of AFDC to cooperate with child support
enforcement measures. 12 These federal regulations require recipients to cooperate by assisting the state agencies in bringing court
actions against the fathers of children of unmarried recipients to
establish paternity, 12' and in obtaining and enforcing child support
judgments against those fathers. 29 The regulations require unemployed individuals, and dependents age sixteen or over and not in
school, to participate in job training and job search programs, if such
programs are available. 1" These measures, however well-intended,

126. For example, one of the stated goals of the Personal Responsibility Act is to "end the
dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promotingjob preparation, work and
marriage." H.R. 4, supra note 1, § 103. This stated goal illustrates the paradox behind these

welfare reform measures. While purporting to encourage the independence of the individuals
who are receiving welfare, the framers of the Act also imposed a normative goal, that of
encouraging marriage, on those same individuals. It remains unclear whether these measures
actually will result in changing the behavior of welfare recipients, or even that the measures
actually are designed to help welfare recipients rather than to save money or accomplish other
normative goals. SeeWilliams, The Ideology ofDivision, supra note 50, at 726-36, 743 (attributing
failure of Wisconsin's Learnfare program to dependence on faulty assumptions, including
assumption that AFDC children miss significantly more school days than non-AFDC children);
iU. at 729-30 (noting Wisconsin administrator's rejection of bill's provision for referral to social
services prior to sanctions as "too costly", even though Wisconsin Department of Health and
Social Services indicates some children fail to attend school because of substance abuse
problems or emotional problems resulting from parents' neglect or abuse).
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26) (1994) (conditioning eligibility for aid on recipient's
assignment to state of any rights to support recipient might have against third persons;
cooperation with state in establishing paternity and obtaining support payments; and
cooperation in identifying and pursuing third persons liable for payment of medical care and
services).
128. See 45 C.F.RI § 232.12(a) (1995) (requiring state plan to condition eligibility on
recipient's cooperation in identifying and locating parent of child, in establishing paternity, and
in obtaining support or other payments due to recipient or child from third persons).
129. See id. § 232.12(b) (defining required cooperation as recipient's appearing at state or
local agency offices, appearing as wimess in judicial hearings, providing information or claiming
lack thereof under penalty of pejury, and payment to agency of funds received after assignment
of recipient's rights to state).
130. See ie. § 250.30 (requiring AFDC recipients in states where resources permit and where
JOBS program is operative to participate inJOBS program); id. § 250.34 (providing sanctions
for failure to participate in JOBS program); see also 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (C) (1994) (listing
statutory exemptions from required job program). The exemptions to the job program
requirement include: (1) ill or incapacitated recipients; (2) recipients caring for ill or
incapacitated persons; (3) recipients who are caretakers of children under three years old; (4)
recipients who are caretakers of children under six years old for whom child care is not provided
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place a great deal of power in the hands of the bureaucrats who work
for the state welfare agencies, power which could be abused through
malice, mistake, or simple oversight. Mistakes made by caseworkers
in performing the oversight could result in recipients losing their
benefits through no fault of their own. An effective appeals process
is an essential component to this system because it protects recipients
from unfair treatment caused by the mistakes of individual caseworkers.
In Illinois, the individual caseworker is authorized to oversee how
the recipient spends money. 3' If the caseworker has reason to
believe that the recipient is not properly using the money to provide
for her children, the caseworker may intervene and provide the
recipient with counseling. 2 If the caseworker has reason to believe
that the caretaker has a substance abuse problem, the caseworker has
more options to address the situation, including: (1) appointment of
another family member as a "protective payee" to oversee the
spending of the money; 3 (2) referral of the recipient's children to
the Department of Children and Family Services; a or (3) referral
3
These regulations
of the recipient to substance abuse treatment."
require the individual caseworkers to closely monitor the lives of
welfare recipients and, at times, to make crucial decisions that could
result in the recipient losing custody of the children. The liberty
remaining for the individual welfare recipient exposed to this scrutiny
is minimal. Again, an effective appeal process is vital.

by state; (5) recipients employed 30 hours or more per week; (6) children under 16 years old;
(7) children over 16 years old but enrolled in school full-time; (8) pregnant women whose
delivery dates coincide with program; and (9) recipients residing in area where programs are
not offered. Id.; see also 45 C.F.1R § 224.0 to .77 (establishing work incentive program pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19)).
131. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 305, para.5/4-8(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1996) (requiring county
department to provide counseling and guidance to ensure best use of money if department has
reason to believe money may not be used in best interests of child and family).
132. Id.
133. Id para. 5/4-8(b) (i).
134. Id. para.5/4-8(b) (ii). The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) is the
child welfare agency in Illinois. A referral to DCFS could result in an investigation of the
household, which in turn could result in the recipient's children being taken away from the
recipient and placed in foster care. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 325, para. 5/7.3-7.5 (Smith-Hurd
1993 & Supp. 1996) (governing DCFS investigations of reports of abused or neglected children);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 325, para. 5/8.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1996) (providing for DCFS to assess
family needs and develop service plans when the Department finds evidence that the child is
abused or neglected); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 325, para. 5/5 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (authorizing law
enforcement officer or DCFS official to take temporary protective custody on emergency basis,
upon determination that there is imminent danger to the life or health of a child); ILL ANN.
STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/2-1-27 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1996) (governing the process for
DCFS to obtain temporary or permanent custody of an abused or neglected minor).
135. Id para. 5/4-8(b) (iii).
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A review of proposed measures in the Personal Responsibility Act
and of welfare reform measures recently approved by the Illinois
General Assembly illustrates the dramatic increase in the power vested
in the bureaucratic state and a persistent diminution of the liberty of
welfare recipients." 6 The Personal Responsibility Act would require

states to enact measures designed to increase work requirements for
welfare recipients, reduce out-of-wedlock births, and reduce teenage
pregnancy.'3 7 The Act originally prohibited states from providing
benefits to unwed teenage mothers" or to families in which the
caretaker fails to cooperate with child enforcement measures. 39
The Act also requires states to reduce benefits to families with a child
whose paternity is not yet established."4 Finally, the Act allows and
encourages states to enact their own measures designed to meet the
goals of the Act."'
In 1995, the Illinois General Assembly enacted two laws that are
indicative of the measures that states would enact under the proposed
block grant system. One law requires all welfare recipients to prepare
and submit a "personal plan for achieving employment,"'4 2 and
includes several measures that toughen work requirements and
impose stiffer sanctions for noncompliance with those requirements."4 The legislature also approved a measure that requires

136. Many of these provisions would require a federal waiver by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1994), before they can take effect because they
do not provide AFDC benefits to all federally defined eligible individuals. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 602 (a) (10) (A) (1994) ("[A]id to families with dependent children shall... be furnished with
reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals"); id. § 1315 (authorizing Secretary of Health
and Human Services to waive compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1994)); King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309, 333 (1968) (invalidating state statute in conflict with Social Security Act's definition of
parent).
137. H.R. 4, supra note 1, § 103.
138. H.R. 4, supra note 1, § 103 (as introduced). The provision prohibiting states from
providing benefits to unwed teenage mothers was removed prior to the approval of the
conference report. H.RL 4, supranote 1, § 103 (conference report), 141 CONG. REC. H15,237
(daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
139. H.R. 4, supranote 1, § 103. In contrast, current regulations allow states to discontinue
benefits for a caretaking relative who is not cooperating with child support enforcement
measures, but provide for the continuation of benefits for the children in the household. 45
C.F.R. § 232.12(d) (1995).
140. H.R. 4, supranote 1, § 103 (directing state to withhold either $50 or 15% of calculated
benefit at state's election from payment to family with child whose paternity is unestablished,
unless child is product of rape or incest).
141. H.R.4,supra note 1, § 103.
142. Act of Mar. 6, 1995, supranote 100, at 209. This seemingly innocuous measure could
result in unfair benefit cuts based on technicalities because it would require functionally
illiterate and non-English speaking recipients to complete the form without any help. To enact
this provision, the state of Illinois has applied for a § 1115 waiver. See id. at 212 (directing
department to request all necessary waivers of federal law).
143. See Act of Mar. 6, 1995, supranote 100, at 210 (requiring any recipient whose youngest
child is between 5 and 13 years of age to participate in job search program for first 6 months
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individuals under age eighteen, who are pregnant or have a child, to
live with her parents in order to receive benefits, 44 and to attend
school if she does not have a high school diploma or a G.E.D. 4s
The Illinois General Assembly also authorized the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) to consider irregular school attendance of
children of elementary school age to be evidence of lack of proper
1 4
and necessary support and care, justifying IDPA intervention. 1
Moreover, the legislature authorized the IDPA to create a "paternity
establishment" program, under which an unwed mother must
cooperate with the Department to establish the paternity of her

of receiving benefits). This measure forces applicants, who may not be ready to look for jobs
due to lack of training and education, to conduct futile job searches and does nothing to
address the real employment barriers faced byAFDC applicants. The bill authorizes the Illinois
Department of Public Aid (IDPA) to establish a targeted jobs program under which recipients
"whose youngest child is age 13 or older shall be required to seek and accept employment," and
limits those recipients to a maximum of 2 years of benefits. See id. at 214 (mandating that
recipients receiving two years of benefits become ineligible for another two years and noting that
birth of child within 10 months of enrollment in program does not extend benefit expiration).
Again, the bill provides no additional resources to aid these recipients to obtain employment,
many of whom may have been out of the job market for over 10 years. The legislation requires
the IDPA to seek a 42 U.S.C. § 1315 waiver from the Secretary of Health and Human Services
for both of these measures. Act of March 6, 1995, supra note 100, at 212. Another measure
would sanction recipients who volunteer for job training programs if they fail to attend those
programs, whereas sanctions were previously limited to those who were required to attend the
programs. Act of Aug. 11, 1995, No. 89-289, § 5, 1995 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3149, 3150 (West) (to be
codified as amended at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 305, para. 5/9A-5). This measure creates a large
disincentive for motivated welfare recipients to volunteer for job training programs.
144. Act of Mar. 6, 1995, supra note 100, at 209. The measure does allow the IDPA to waive
this requirement under certain conditions, including when the IDPA determines that the
requirement of the recipient living with her parents would jeopardize the physical health or
safety of the individual or her child. Id at 209-10; see also id. (exempting minor with no known
living parent or legal guardian and minor who has lived apart from parent or guardian for at
least one year prior to child's birth). Significantly, this measure, like others, gives sole discretion
to the IDPA alone to make the determination of whether the physical health or safety of the
minor would be threatened. See id at 209 (indicating that "Illinois Department may make
exception" to requirement that minor live at home) (emphasis added).
It should be noted that requiring minors to remain at home may be counterproductive in that
a high percentage of teen mothers studied have suffered sexual abuse, and that some minors
become pregnant to avoid abuse in the home. See Teen Moms Linked to Abuse TOLEDO BLADE
(Toledo, Ohio), Sept. 11, 1995, at 3 (citing studies that found between 61% and 66% of teen
mothers had been sexually abused and relating teenage mother's mistaken belief that becoming
pregnant would shield her from further molestation).
145. Act of Mar. 6, 1995, supranote 100, at 210.
146. See Act of Mar. 6, 1995, supra note 100, at 213 (requiring IDPA to establish programs
encouraging school attendance, that families with attendance problems must attend under
penalty of initiating protective payments and requiring department to impose further sanctions
if attendance does not improve after three months under protective payment regime). The bill
authorizes establishment of an experimental program to test the effectiveness of such an
approach. See id. (authorizing implementation of these changes through use of emergency
rules). A similar program was adopted by the State of Wisconsin several years ago, with little
success. See Williams, The Ideology ofDhsion, supra note 50, at 720-36 (describing failure of
Wisconsin's Learnfare program, targeting teens and reducing benefits to recipient parent if teen
misses too many classes).
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child. 4 Under the program, an unwed mother can receive AFDC
benefits only for six months before the paternity of her child is
The laws also include increased child support
established."
enforcement measures, such as giving the IDPA the power to institute
professional license revocation proceedings if a non-custodial parent
is in arrears on child support payments to a custodial parent who is
a welfare recipient.149
Many of these measures are based on faulty assumptions, 150 and
will result in increased governmental intrusion without a corresponding benefit for the recipients. In fact, these "reforms" are barely
justifiable as measures to improve the lives of welfare recipients, or to
help them to end the cycle of dependency. For example, the Illinois
General Assembly passed a measure that would prohibit the IDPA
from approving a recipient's "participation in any post-secondary
education program, other than full-time, short-term vocational
training for a specific job, unless the individual also is employed parttime," as defined by regulation."' 1 Thus, the legislature precluded
recipients from receiving support to participate in a comprehensive

147. Act of Mar. 6, 1995, supra note 100, at 221.
148. Id, The Act allows the Department to waive this requirement under certain
circumstances, including when the custodial parent "attests under oath to fear of abuse by the
putative father." Id.; see also id. (listing other exemptions from paternity established deadline
such as that child is not yet born; paternity already was established; putative father is
incarcerated; court proceeding to establish paternity is pending at expiration of 6 months and
mother is still cooperative; child is product of rape by unknown assailant; and mother is
cooperative but identity cannot be established).
149. See Act of Mar. 6, 1995, supra note 100, § 3, at 204; id. § 10, at 205. The bill also
authorizes the IDPA to collect child support "in any manner authorized for the collection of a
delinquent personal income tax liability." Id. § 15, at 206. This measure will help women who
are welfare recipients to obtain child support from the fathers of their children, arguably
creating some empowerment for them. Professor Charles A. Reich, however, cites the use of
licensing as leverage to influence individual activity as an extreme example of the intrusiveness
of the bureaucratic state on individual liberty. See Reich, supranote 120, at 1428 (arguing that
licenses become "weapons of coercion" when used to implement policies unrelated to purposes
underlying issuance of license). Criticizing a West Virginia statute that suspends the driver's
licenses of high school drop-outs under the age of 18, W. VA. CODE § 18-8-11 (Supp. 1995),
Reich states that "It]hose who applaud this ingenuity are insensitive to the regulatory state's
potential for tyranny." Reich, supra note 120, at 1428. The new policy of the State of Illinois,
though helpful to mothers who seek child support, also creates a potential for tyranny against
those who fall behind in child support payments. More significantly for the purposes of this
Article, it requires welfare recipients to participate in this "tyranny," willingly or not.
150. See Williams, The Ideology ofDision, supra note 50, at 727-28, 733-41 (noting empirical
data does not support adoption of Learnfare and Family Cap programs and arguing that
programs instead are premised on "superficial notions about the psychology of poor families"
and belief in welfare recipients' "deviant values" manipulable by heavy handed economics).
Legis. Serv. 3149, 3154 (West) (to be
151. Act of Aug. 11, 1995, No. 89-289, § 5, 1995 Ill.
codified as amended at ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 305, para. 5/9A-9(h)). The Personal Responsibility
Act contains similar restrictions on educational programs for welfare recipients. See H.R. 4, supra
note 1, § 103 (defining "work activities" so as not to include any post-secondary education except
on-the-job training and "training directly related to employment"); id. (conditioning federal
block grant on state's attaining increasing rates of participation by recipients in work activities).
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educational program provided by a college or community college.
Whereas a college degree would truly enable welfare recipients to
obtain jobs that would pay them enough to end their dependence on
public assistance, limited vocational training will limit recipients to
low-payingjobs with little possibility for advancement, making it more
likely that they will require governmental assistance in the future.
Moreover, the Illinois General Assembly voted to end the federally
funded AFDC program, and replace it with temporary, state-funded
transitional assistance, that would not have the federally imposed
restrictions of the current AFDC program (including the statutory
entitlement status of AFDC benefits), and would be terminated by the
state at the discretion of the state government, without any due
process protections for recipients
while recipients search for jobs or
15 2
support.
child
receive
to
begin
The goal of these reforms, therefore, is not to end dependence on
public assistance, but to end public assistance itself, depriving
recipients a means to survive without the assistance upon which they
have become dependent. The result of these reforms is an increase
in the power of the public aid bureaucrats, the erosion of liberty of
public aid recipients, and the likely termination of benefits for many
recipients who are unable to comply with all of the conditions on
which eligibility for assistance is based. Advocates for low-income
clients, especially clients who are women and/or people of color,
must combat these restrictions by attempting to ensure that the state
retain the due process system by aiding their clients in complying with
restrictive measures, and by reducing the intrusion on what little
liberty they have left in our society.
Leaving aside the goals of reformers, even the most well-intentioned
reform measures will require the state to make difficult judgments,
increasing the need for a due process system to insure that those
judgments are made fairly. What about the mother who has been
brutally victimized by the child's father and has just succeeded in
cutting off all contact with him, who must help the caseworker to reinitiate contact in order to establish paternity and enforce child

152. Act of Mar. 6, 1995, supranote 100, at 209 (ending old programs implementing AFDC
and stating, "The Illinois Department shall develop an alternative program of mutual
responsibility between the Illinois Department and the client to allow the family to become selfsufficient or employed as quickly as possible through (i) the provision of transitional assistance
to families in the form of emergency one-time payments to preventjob loss, temporary assistance
while searching for or being trained for work, or paternity establishment and child support
enforcement or (ii) the provision for continued work").
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support payments? 5 3 What about the woman who misses scheduled
appointments for job interviews or training because her car broke
down, or because her child is sick at home? Impartial hearings and
judicial oversight will be necessary to insure that caseworkers are fair
when they make the judgments required to address these situations.
States must protect due process rights to ensure that welfare recipients receive fair treatment and to protect recipients from needless
intrusion into their lives, intrusion destined to result only in denial or
termination of their benefits.
V.

COURT RULINGS ON BENEFIT REDUCTIONS

The Personal Responsibility Act gives states wide latitude to reduce
welfare programs and the administrative protections that currently
exist for welfare recipients. Given the restrictions on the financial
resources of states, state governments will likely cut back on both the
amount of benefits and the protections to which recipients are
currently entitled. An analysis of recent case law regarding the due
process rights of recipients indicates that the courts also will be of
little help to recipients attempting to protect their rights. Courts have
found that broad-based reductions in eligibility or benefit amounts,
like those proposed in the Personal Responsibility Act, do not trigger
the due process rights of welfare recipients.
In Atkins v. Parker," the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a generalized notice that Massachusetts issued to food
stamp recipients.155 The notice informed recipients that their food
stamp benefit levels might be decreased as a result of reductions in

153. Current federal regulations allow for an exception to the duty to cooperate with child
support enforcement officials where the applicant's or recipient's cooperation would result in
physical or emotional harm to the parent or child. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 232.42(a) (1), 232.42(b)
(1995) (identifying "good cause" circumstances and requiring physical or emotional harm to be
.of a serious nature" and also requiring demonstration of an emotional impairment that
substantially affects the individual's "functioning"); id. § 232.42(a) (2) (allowinggood cause when
child is product of rape or incest, child's adoption proceeding is pending, or child's parent is
considering for no longer than three months relinquishing child for adoption). The state
agency may require corroborative evidence of abuse. See id. § 232.43(b). Such determinations
are made by the individual case worker. Under the existing system, the recipient has the right
to appeal an unfavorable determination with the full right to a due process hearing. See 42
U.S.C. § 602(a) (4) (1994). To the contrary, the Personal Responsibility Act appears not even
to allow states to create an exception to the duty to cooperate on the basis of physical or
emotional abuse. See H.R. 4, supra note 1, § 103 (imposing absolute prohibition on aid to
families with individual not cooperating in paternity establishment or support enforcement); id
(mandating less than full benefit payments to families including child of unknown paternity
unless child is product of rape or incest).
154. 472 U.S. 115 (1985).
155. Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 127 (1985).
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the federal food stamp program. 5 6 The Court held that across-theboard cuts did not trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause
and, therefore, recipients were not entitled to individualized
Significantly, the Court distinguished its ruling in
notices. 5
Goldberg that the state must give detailed individualized notices of
adverse actions in individual cases, stating that "[t] his case, however,
does not concern the procedural fairness of individual eligibility
determinations" but "[r]ather, it involves a legislatively mandated
substantive change in the scope of the entire program. "158 The
Court found that the legislative process gives recipients all the process
that they are due when benefit levels are adjusted by the legisla59

ture.1

Under Atkins, welfare recipients would have no recourse if the state
terminates their AFDC benefits on an across-the-board basis, as a
result of the Personal Responsibility Act. Since Atkins, other courts
have upheld similar across-the-board actions by states. For example,
in Rosas v. McMahon,"6° the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit found no due process violation when the State of
California gave individual notices of benefit cuts to AFDC recipients
before the cuts were implemented, but after their effective dates."'
The court held that due process did not require a "grace period,"'6
which would limit Congress' ability to cut AFDC benefits. 63 In
Slaughter v. Levine,"6 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
found no due process violation when the State of Minnesota
implemented a "lump sum" rule, reducing the AFDC benefits of all
6
recipients without any prior notice. 5

156. Id. at 120-21.
157. Id. at 129-30.
158. Id. at 129.
159. Id. at 129-30 (reiterating Court's position that "'welfare recipient is not deprived of due
process when the legislature adjusts benefit levels.... IT]he legislative determination provides
all the process that is due'" (quoting Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432-33
(1982))).
160. 945 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1991).
161. Rosas v. McMahan, 945 F.2d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1991).
162. Id. at 1474-75.
163. Id. at 1474 (rejecting plaintiff's interpretation that grace period was required because
this "would invalidate the statutory reduction in entitlements until notice was given to
recipients"). But see Atkins, 472 U.S. at 130 (noting that presumption that citizens have
knowledge of law "may be overcome in cases in which the statute does not allow a sufficient
'grace period' to provide the persons affected by a change in the law with an adequate
opportunity to become familiar with their obligations under it").
164. 855 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
165. Slaughter v. Levine, 855 F.2d 553, 554 (8th Cir. 1988) (per cuiam) (finding plaintiff's
request for some notice indistinguishable from plaintiff's losing claim in Atkins for better notice
in that "neither argument survives the rule that the regular legislative process completely satisfies
the Due Process Clause").
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The rulings in Atkins, Rosas, and Slaughterillustrate the willingness
of courts to uphold broad-based reductions in welfare benefits, and
to limit strictly the extent to which welfare beneficiaries are entitled
to Go/dberg-style due process when changes are made in their benefits
levels. The rulings also indicate that welfare recipients will be unable
to bring successful court challenges to the termination of their
entitlements by Congress.
Under the proposed system of block grants, the due process rights
of recipients to appeal state actions on their individual cases also
would be eliminated because welfare recipients are only entitled to
due process hearings because of their statutory entitlement to
benefits.1" As a result, the states would be free to make arbitrary
decisions on a case-by-case basis. Without the means to establish an
entitlement to the benefits they currently receive, welfare recipients
would be unable to challenge effectively the state's actions on their
individual cases, as they are now unable to challenge changes that
affect all recipients. Similarly, applicants for welfare would be unable
to challenge effectively the denial of their benefits.167 Because court
challenges based on traditional litigation strategies, particularly attacks
on the lack of an effective appeals process as violative of the Due
Process Clause, are likely to fail, advocates for welfare beneficiaries
must be open to new approaches.
VI. PROTECTING DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Currently, all states have a system of due process hearings for
welfare recipients because they are mandated to do so by federal
Meaningful due process hearing systems must be
regnlations."
maintained by states, even if the proposed reforms and accompanying
regulations do not require them as a condition of states' receipt of
federal welfare funds. I suggest three principal approaches to

166. SeeBoard ofRegents of State Colleges v.Roth, 408 U.S. 564,576-78 (1972) (finding that
due process protects property interests against deprivation and that statute created and defined
welfare recipients' protected property interest). In Roth, the Court clarified that due process
protection is triggered only by an identifiable liberty or property interest. Idat 569. Moreover,
a property interest in a benefit is not simply an individual's "unilateral expectation" of that
benefit but instead requires "a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id. at 577. The Court
noted that its decision in Goldberg was based on the fact that welfare recipients "had a claim of
entitlement to welfare payments that was grounded in the statute defining eligibility for them."
Id.; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970) (characterizing welfare benefits as
statutory entitlements for those eligible and "welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than
a 'gratuity'"). Under Roth, therefore, welfare recipients would not be entitled to due process
rights once their benefits are no longer statutory entitlements.
167. Arguably, applicants would enjoy even less protection because they have not yet
established any property interest in the receipt of their benefits.
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (4) (1994).
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preserving due process fights in the aftermath of enactment of the
Personal Responsibility Act or other legislation ending the entitlement
status of welfare benefits.'69 The first approach is to use the political process to attempt to convince state legislators to maintain the
existing system. The second approach focuses on establishing an
entitlement to welfare benefits under state law, which would trigger
due process protections under state constitutions.
The third
approach is to challenge the termination of due process hearings on
the ground that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees welfare recipients the same right to due
process hearings as other beneficiaries of public benefits.
A.

Use of the PoliticalProcess

The proposed reforms would allow states great latitude in formulating plans for the administration of welfare benefits.170 Advocates
must use political pressure to convince state legislators to maintain
due process hearings in new state welfare institutions. As a means of
achieving this end, they must push for the participation of welfare
recipients in the process of creating state welfare systems. If welfare
recipients themselves are allowed a voice in the creation of the new
state administrative systems, those systems are likely to be more
responsive to their needs and include provisions for due process
hearings.
Institutional conservatism weighs in favor of this approach. Due
process systems have been in effect for many years, both for welfare
recipients and beneficiaries of other government benefits or licenses.
State legislators may be reluctant to alter drastically the states'
administrative systems by eliminating procedural protections. Fiscal
conservatism, however, weighs against this approach. Given the
limited resources allocated to the states in the form of block grants,
states may eliminate due process hearings as one of many cost-cutting
measures.

169. These approaches are not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, they are suggested means
toward achieving a vital goal. An exhaustive listing and discussion of possible approaches would
be an appropriate subject for another law review article.
170. See H.R. 4, supra note 1, § 103 (encouraging states to develop "innovative approaches
to employing recipients" with assistance and evaluation of Secretary of Health and Human
Services); see also supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Act to increase
flexibility).
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Use of State Law

My second suggested approach is to rely on state constitutions,
which may require due process rights for welfare recipients. State
constitutions may provide more extensive rights to their citizens than
those enumerated in the U.S. Constitution.' 7' Moreover, the very
structure of state governments means that rights explicitly mentioned
in state constitutions are substantive guarantees of fights, not simply
restrictions on state power like the fights listed in the U.S. Constitution. 72
For that reason, many commentators have advocated
pursuing state constitutional rights in light of recent conservative
73
Supreme Court decisions.
Some state constitutions guarantee substantive rights to their
citizens, such as health and safety, including the constitutions of New
York and New Jersey. 5 Under these state constitutions, welfare

171. See, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 670-71 (1982) (concluding that Oregon
Court of Appeals did not uphold defendant's contention that doublejeopardy barred his retrial
"based upon an adequate and independent state ground" and thus reversed that court's
interpretation of DoubleJeopardy Clause); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81
(1980) ("Our reasoning ... does not ex proprio vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise
its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution."); California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33,
34-35 (1972) (reversing and remanding case to Supreme Court of California because Court was
unable to determine whether state court predicated its decision on federal constitution grounds
or on adequate and independent state grounds).
172. See John C. Connell, A Right to Emergency Shelter for the Homeless Under the New Jersey
Constitution, 18 RUTGERS LJ. 765,815 (1987) (noting thatstructural differences between Federal
Constitution's "grant of enumerated powers," and state constitutions', "limit[s] on sovereign
power ... inhering directly in the people," give rise "to the function of fundamental rights
explicitly affirmed in the state constitution [s] as guarantees of those rights and not restrictions
upon them").
173. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as GuardiansofIndividualRights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 550-51 (1986) (noting that
federalism permits "state courts to provide greater protection to individual civil rights and
liberties if they wish to do so" and believing liberals and conservatives should greet this "rebirth
of interest in state constitutional law ... with equal enthusiasm"); William J. Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977) ("[S]tate
courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal
Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law.");
Connell, supra note 172, at 795 (arguing that "[i]n order to achieve adequate levels of selfemergency shelter should be recognized as a legal right
sufficiency for today's homeless ....
under the NewJersey Constitution"); Florence Wagman Roisman, Establishinga Right to Housing.
An Advocate's Guide, in THE RIGHTS OF THE HOMELESS 9 (Practicing Law Institute, 1992) (stating
that right to housing emerging from "state lawmaking and state court litigation involving state
constitutions and state statutes" is "most hopeful development for the cause of social justice in
the United States").
174. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 3 ("The protection and promotion of the health of the
inhabitants of the state are matters of public concern and provision therefor shall be made by
the state and by such of its subdivisions and in such manner, and by such means as the
legislature shall from time to time determine.").
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recipients may be entitled to public benefits as a means of maintaining their health and safety. If welfare recipients are entitled to
benefits under state constitutions, then they are also entitled to
Goldberg-style due process protection. The constitutional entitlement
to benefits would be the "property" interest protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution, triggering administrative appeal
rights.
One example of a possible state entitlement to welfare benefits is
based on the right to a minimum income as a means of achieving the
constitutional guarantees of health and safety. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey adopted a similar theory in Franklin v. New Jersey
Department of Human Services,17 6 in which the court recognized a
fundamental right to shelter based on the state's constitutional
guarantee of providing for the health of its citizens.1 77 Arguably,
the right to a minimum income with which to obtain food and shelter
is even more essential to one's health and well-being than a right to
shelter standing alone.
Currently, to receive matching federal welfare funds, a state must
prepare a "standard of need" report that details the amount of money
a family needs to be able to afford the necessities of life, including
If a family's income falls below that
food, shelter, and clothing."
standard, the family is "needy" and is therefore eligible for AFDC
benefits. 179 The "standard of need" provides a quantifiable measure
of what constitutes the "health" or "safety" that some state constitutions guarantee its citizens. Under this theory, the state must provide

175. NJ. CONST. art. I, para. 1 ("All persons are by nature free and independent, and have
certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining
safety and happiness.")
176. 543 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1988).
177. Franklin v. NewJersey Dep't of Human Servs., 543 A.2d 1,2, 8-10 (N.J. 1988).
178. 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.20(a)(2), 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(a) (1995) (requiring states to specify
statewide standard for determining need and to calculate need of applicant/recipient by
comparing applicant/recipient's non-exempted income and resources to statewide need
standard). Under the proposed block grant system, states may no longer be required to
perform this calculation. For the purposes of this argument, however, the existing reports would
serve as a reliable standard for the near future. In addition, at least one state, NewJersey, is
required to set its own standard of need for state-funded benefits programs. See In re
Rulemaking, NJ.A.C. 10:82-1.2 and 10:85-4.1, 566 A.2d 1154, 1160-61 (N.J. 1989) (noting "that
the establishment of [need] standards is a reasonably necessary exercise even if the resources
of government do not allow for fulfillment of the needs"); Roisman, supra note 173, at 21-25
(discussing successful attempts to add substance to rhetoric contained in NewJersey's General
Assistance and AFDC legislation).
179. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(b). The state, however, is not required to meet that standard with
its level of benefits. SeeRosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397,408 (1970) (noting that Congress gives
states discretion in calculating standard of need and also in declining whether or not to meet
that need in benefit levels).
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that its citizens meet that minimum standard of need to provide for
the health and safety of its citizens, resulting in the right to a
income for those citizens, which would trigger due process
minimum
18 0
rights.
On the one hand, this approach is appealing because it fits well
with a Goldberg-style approach that is based on the recipient's
entitlement to benefits. Once the courts had found an entitlement
to benefits, it is likely that they would follow the precedent of Goldberg
to establish the recipient's right to due process hearings. On the
other hand, this approach could only be successful in states that have
constitutions granting substantive rights, such as New York and New
Jersey, and of course, courts in different states are likely to interpret
those constitutions differently. Welfare beneficiaries in some states
would be eligible for due process protections, while recipients in
other states would not even be entitled to benefits. The resulting
unfairness makes this approach problematic, even if it is partially

successful.
C.

Use of Equal ProtectionArguments

The third approach I recommend is to challenge the elimination
of due process hearings for welfare recipients as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"" Virtually all
recipients of government licenses and benefits have a right to a due
process hearing if those benefits are terminated." 2 Beneficiaries of
licenses, such as drivers' licenses, and other government benefits, such
as unemployment insurance benefits, are similarly situated to
recipients of welfare benefits because they all derive wealth from
those governmental licenses or benefits. Denying due process rights
to welfare recipients, but not to recipients of other forms of governmental wealth, would create a unique classification of beneficiaries of
governmental wealth with fewer procedural rights than other

180. But ef. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 473, 481 (1970) (upholding Maryland's
imposition of grant maximum despite fact that it resulted in smaller benefits per capita to large
families because statute mandated only that "some aid" be provided and not amount deemed
necessary under standard of need).
181. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides "No State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, § 1.
182. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56, §§ 2720.1-.25 (1995) (Department of Employment
Security, Claims, Adjudication and Appeals); ILu ADMIN. CODE tit. 92, §§ 101.300-.370 (1995)
(Rules on the Conduct of Informal Hearings in Driver's License Suspensions and Revocations);
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 680.230 (1995) (Procedure for Initiation and Resolution of
Complaints Seeking Revocation or Suspension of a License of a Private Employment Agency or
Employment Counselor, Rules of Procedure in Administrative Hearings).
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beneficiaries of that wealth, a classification that may violate the Equal
Protection Clause.
In analyzing whether the state's regulation of governmental benefits
violates the Equal Protection Clause, courts apply a rational basis
analysis, upholding the regulation if it is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest."a The only legitimate purpose that the
state is likely to identify in denying procedural protections to welfare
recipients would be to save money by reducing administrative
bureaucracy. The Supreme Court, however, generally defers to
legislatures when applying rational basis review, upholding regulations
based on minimal showings of legitimate purpose on the part of the
legislature." 4 Plaintiffs may have a difficult time convincing the
Court to uphold an equal protection challenge to the denial of
procedural protections to welfare recipients. Nevertheless, two factors
make it more likely that an equal protection challenge to the denial
of procedural rights to welfare beneficiaries will succeed. First, in
several cases involving the state's administration of governmental
benefits, the Court has applied a slightly higher level of scrutiny than
rational basis scrutiny and struck the regulations down.1" Second,
the nature of the procedural rights at issue also counsels in favor of
the Court's applying a heightened standard of review. If the Court
applies a slightly heightened standard of review, it might strike down
the failure to provide procedural hearings to welfare recipients as
violative of equal protection.

183. SeeDepartment ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,533-34 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970), discussed supranote 64. In Dandridge, the Court found that there is
no fundamental right to a minimum income, and reasoned that state rules governing the
administration of welfare benefits, alone, was economic regulation that required nothing more
than a rational relation to a legitimate state interest. 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
184. See, eg., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981) (holding that rational basis
standard does not allow courts to substitute its notions of good public policy for those of
Congress); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980) (holding that if statedrawn classification has some rational basis, court will not invalidate it simply because it is unwise
or unartfully drawn); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) (upholding Hyde Amendment,
which prohibited use of federal Medicaid funds for abortions, as being rationally related to "the
legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life").
185. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (striking down Alaska statute under which
state's distribution of dividends was proportional to amount of time that each resident had lived
in state as violative of equal protection); Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 186-88); Department of Agric. v. Murry, 413
U.S. 508, 514 (1973) (invalidating Federal Food Stamp Act's exclusion of households in which
any member over 18 years of age had been claimed, during prior tax year, as dependent on
federal income tax return of taxpayer not member of eligible household, on equal protection
grounds); NewJersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973) (striking down New
Jersey's denial of state-funded welfare benefits to families with illegitimate children as violative
of equal protection).
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In Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,'86 the Court applied the
rational basis analysis and struck down a federal statute that denied
food stamps to recipients in households containing an unrelated
member, but allowed benefits in similar households without unrelated
members, as violating the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 8 7 Moreno is widely recognized
as applying a standard that is higher than the stated rational basis
analysis, based in part on the Court's solicitude for poor plaintiffs. 1a1
In recent years, the Court has been significantly less solicitous of the
rights of the poor.8 9 The essential nature of welfare benefits,
however, and the fact that welfare recipients stand to lose their entire
means of livelihood if their benefits are wrongly denied or terminated, 19° argue strongly in favor of the Court applying an informally
higher standard of review, as it did in Moreno, to strike down the lack
of procedural rights for welfare recipients.
Arguably, it is not rational for states to provide welfare recipients
fewer procedural rights than those provided, for example, to people
who stand to lose only their drivers' licenses. Moreover, the Court
need not accept the stated purpose at face value, but may examine
the legislative scheme to determine whether the asserted purpose is

186. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
187. Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
188. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 54547 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting that measure meets
rational basis test where measure effects congressional goal of prevention of fraudulent use of
food stamps); Clerburne v. Clerburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 459 n.4 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing Moreno as example of "intermediate
review decisions masquerading in rational basis language" (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTiTUTIONAL LAW § 16-50, 1645-46 (2d ed. 1988))).

189. See, e.g., Lyng v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am., 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (upholding congressional Act denying food
stamps to households of striking workers who would otherwise be eligible as not violative of
equal protection); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (upholding federal food stamp
regulations that presume that parents, children, and siblings live together as one household, but
presume that unrelated persons or more distant relatives are separate households, entitling them
to a higher level of benefits, unless they also customarily purchase food together, as not violative
of equal protection); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (upholding denial of
supplemental subsistence benefits to needy aged, blind, and disabled persons in public
institutions, even though, but for their institutionalization, they were otherwise eligible for
benefits, as not violative of equal protection).
190. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 471, 522 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("AFDC
support to needy dependent children provides the stuff that sustains those children's lives: food,
clothing, shelter."); see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 ("For qualified recipients, welfare
provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing and medical care....
Termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible
recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits."). That welfare benefits are the only
means of livelihood for recipients has been a significant factor in some court decisions
governing the administration of those benefits. See Goudberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (identifying as
crucial factor that recipient's "situation becomes immediately desperate" upon termination of
benefits).

1146

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1111

the actual goal of the legislation.19 ' Under such scrutiny, states
would be hard put to articulate a legitimate state interest on which to
base such a distinction, and the likely stated purpose of reducing
administrative costs would not suffice. "The extent to which
procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced
by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous
loss.""92 Saving money and earning political favor by reducing the
rights of those who arguably need them the most, simply because
those people do not have political power and are politically unpopular, should not withstand scrutiny as a legitimate state interest. "For
if the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws'
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate state interest." 93
Given the nature of the procedural protections at issue here, the
Court also may apply a higher standard of scrutiny to the denial of
those protections to a discreet classification of beneficiaries of
governmental benefits. The Court has applied a higher level of
scrutiny when the governmental statute restricted access to the
courts,"94 schools,'9 5 or political process 9 ' on the basis of income, analogous to the denial of procedural protections to welfare
recipients. In Boddie v. Connecticut,97 for example, the Court found
that the State of Connecticut violated the equal protection rights of
indigent plaintiffs who wanted divorces, by refusing to waive filing fees

191. SeeWeinbergerv. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,648 n.16 (1975). In equal protection cases,
courts need not accept legislative purpose at face value, "when an examination of the legislative
scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the
legislation").
192. Godbeg 397 U.S. at 262-63 (quotingJoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
193. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
194. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1971) (holding unconstitutional state
law conditioningjudicial decree of divorce upon claimant's ability to pay fees and costs); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (holding unconstitutional Virginia law prohibiting persons
from advising others that their legal rights had been violated and prohibiting attorneys from
taking on cases so initiated). But see United States v. Eras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973) (holding
that requirement that indigent petitioners pay filing fee for bankruptcy actions does not violate
equal protection); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 661 (1973) (per curiam) (finding that
Oregon's refusal to waive $25 court filing fee for welfare recipients filing administrative review
actions did not violate equal protection).
195. SeePlyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220-24 (1982) (holding that Texas law denying children
of illegal immigrants access to public schools violated equal protection).
196. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (striking down Texas system of financing
primaries whereby candidates themselves were required to pay filing fees); Cipriano v. Houma,
395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (striking down Louisiana law restricting to "property taxpayers" right
to vote in some municipal elections); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665
(1966) (invalidating state poll tax).
197. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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for those plaintiffs, effectively denying them access to the divorce
courts on the basis of their income.19 Similarly, the Court may find
that the legislature cannot deny welfare recipients, the recipients of
governmental benefits with the lowest incomes, access to public
hearings when access is accorded to other recipients of governmental
benefits.
The rule expressed by the Court in Boddie has been weakened by its
subsequent rulings in United States v. Kras,99 and Ortwein v.

Schwab." In Kras, the Court found that the federal court's failure
to waive bankruptcy fees did not deny equal protection rights of
bankruptcy petitioners." 1 The Court distinguished its ruling from
that in Boddie in part on the basis that in Boddie, the only means for
resolving the plaintiffs legal dispute (i.e., to dissolve the marriage)
was to file for divorce, but the bankruptcy petitioners could resolve
their disputes with their creditors in other ways, such as entering into
payment plans, without resort to bankruptcy court.0 2 In Ortwein,
the Court found that petitioners challenging the State of Oregon's
refusal to waive a $25 court fee for filing administrative review appeals
of welfare benefit hearings did not violate the equal protection rights
of the petitioners. Again, the Court distinguished the facts from
those in Boddie, pointing out that the petitioners already had the right
to a due process hearing prior to filing their review actions. 03
The issue at hand is distinguishable, however, from both Kras and
Ortwein due to the lack of alternatives available to welfare recipients,
and the historical commitment to due process rights of welfare
recipients. In Boddie, the court reasoned that the only means for the
plaintiffs to resolve their legal issues was to file for divorce in
court.214 Similarly, if the state does not provide welfare recipients
with procedural protections, they will have no recourse whatsoever if
their benefits are wrongly denied or terminated. Like the plaintiffs
in Boddie, they would have no access to a forum in which to resolve
their legal disputes, differentiating them from the plaintiffs in Kras
and Ortwein.2°5 In Boddie, the Court also recognized an historic
198. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1971).
199. 409 U.S. 434 (1972).
200. 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam).
201. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1972).
202. Id at 445.
203. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1973) (per curiam).
204. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375-76.
205. In addition, it would be particularly ironic for the Court to rely on the precedent of
Ortwein to deny procedural protections to welfare beneficiaries, because the Court emphasized
the availability of due process hearings for welfare recipients as alternative forums for the
plaintiffs in its Oriwein ruling. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659-60.
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commitment to the rights of privacy and family rights, which militated
in favor of the indigent plaintiffs' access to divorce courts." 8 In
both Kras and Ortwein, the Court downplayed the economic interests
at stake, distinguishing them from the fundamental nature of an
individual's rights regarding the family. 7 Therefore, if the Court
perceives the Equal Protection argument to be one based purely on
the economic interests of the welfare recipients, it is unlikely to rule
on their behalf. Given the historical commitment of the state to
process, however, the Court may also find it to be "of basic importance to our society,"2 ' and apply the Boddie ruling in favor of the
recipients.'o9
Finally, welfare beneficiaries need not be otherwise entitled to
procedural protections in order for them to successfully challenge the
denial of those protections. In Boddie, the plaintiffs were not
otherwise entitled to obtain a divorce. In Plyler v. Doe, the Court
struck down a Texas statute prohibiting the children of illegal
immigrants from attending public schools.210
The Court had
already determined that the right to attend public school was not a
fundamental right,2" but found that once the state had made it
available to some children, it could not deny it to others based solely
on the illegal immigrant status of the children's parents. 21 2 Under
the system established pursuant to the new welfare reform proposals,
welfare beneficiaries also would not be entitled to due process
hearings, just as the plaintiffs in Plyler were not entitled to attend
public school. Welfare beneficiaries would have an uphill battle in
their equal protection challenge to the denial of due process

206.

Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376 (emphasizing that "marriage involves interests of basic

importance in our society").
207. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659 (stating that appellant's interest in increased welfare benefits,
"like that in Kras, has far less constitutional significance than the interest of the Boddie
applicants"); Kras, 409 U.S. at 443-44 (distinguishing Boddi in part, on the importance of
individual's rights regarding family, as opposed to purely economic interests involved in
bankruptcy case).
208. Boddi, 401 U.S. at 376.
209. This arguments speaks to the concerns of those, such as Professor Richard Saphire, who
have expressed to me in conversation the view that due process hearings are so fundamental
that the right to them cannot be abolished, and allows the Court an angle with which to
maintain those rights in accordance with existing precedence.
210. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). Although the Court specifically declined to
apply heightened scrutiny based on the ethnicity of the plaintiffs, id. at 220-24, who were
primarily of Hispanic descent, that may also have played a role creating a "quasi-suspece class
which led to the Plylercourt'sapplication of a heightened level of scrutiny. Similarly, the racial

composition of welfare recipients, who are almost 50% non-white, see supra note 7, may also
support a heightened standard of scrutiny when examining the denial of due process hearings
to welfare recipients.
211. San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
212. Id.
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hearings. Under the rulings of Moreno, Boddie, and Plyler, however,
they might have a chance to succeed.

CONCLUSION

The goal of welfare reform should be to improve the system so
that people who receive welfare can become self-actualizing human
beings who are no longer dependent on welfare. If society wants
welfare recipients to take personal responsibility for their actions, the
government must give them a fair system that empowers these
recipients to do so. Structured rights, such as due process rights, can
empower recipients of public benefits, thereby helping them to break
their dependence on those benefits. Due process is essential for
welfare recipients, who live in the "outside" sphere in our society, and
are disenfranchised due to their income level, race, and/or gender.
Recent reforms, which intrude on the autonomy of recipients and
may result in the termination of their benefits, make due process even
more crucial for those recipients.
As courts have been unresponsive to the due process claims of
welfare recipients brought under the traditional Goldberg analysis,
welfare advocates must find other means to maintain due process
rights. For example, they should stress advocacy for procedural rights
within the political process. Rights to a minimum income may be
found in state constitutions. Finally, welfare recipients may be
entitled to procedural protections under an equal protection analysis.
Writing for the majority in Goldberg v. Kelly, Justice Brennan stated:
From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to
foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders.... Public assistance... is not mere charity, but a means to

'promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty
to ourselves and our Posterity.' The same governmental interests
that counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted provision to those eligible to receive it; pre-termination
evidentiary hearings are indispensable to that end."'
Justice Brennan's words still ring true today. A welfare system that
includes pre-termination due process hearings is vital to ensure that
we have a society that treats people fairly and with the dignity that
they deserve.

213.

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970).

